Borders in Cyberspace:
Conflicting Public Sector Information Policies
and their Economic Impacts
Summary
Report
Peter Weiss
U. S.
Department of Commerce
National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
National
Weather Service
February
2002
Disclaimer
The views
expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the U.S. National Weather Service. Contract support from
Yvette Pluijmers, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, is gratefully acknowledged.
Many nations are embracing the concept of open and
unrestricted access to public sector information -- particularly scientific,
environmental, and statistical information of great public benefit. Federal information policy in the US
is based on the premise that government information is a valuable national
resource and that the economic benefits to society are maximized when taxpayer
funded information is made available inexpensively and as widely as possible.
This policy is expressed in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and in Office
of Management and Budget Circular No. A-130, “Management of Federal Information
Resources.”[1] This policy actively encourages the
development of a robust private sector, offering to provide publishers with the
raw content from which new information services may be created, at no more than
the cost of dissemination and without copyright or other restrictions.
In other
countries, particularly in Europe, publicly funded government agencies treat
their information holdings as a commodity used to generate short-term revenue.
They assert monopoly control on certain categories of information to recover
the costs of its collection or creation. Such arrangements tend to preclude
other entities from developing markets for the information or otherwise
disseminating the information in the public interest.
In the US, open and unrestricted
access to public sector information has resulted in the rapid growth of
information intensive industries particularly in the geographic information and
environmental services sectors. Similar growth has not occurred in Europe due
to restrictive government information practices. As a convenient shorthand, one
might label the American and European approaches as ‘open access’ and ‘cost
recovery’, respectively. The cost recovery model is now being challenged on a
variety of grounds:
·
Economists
argue that the benefits to the American Treasury that accrue from corporate and
individual taxes from the secondary publishing and service activities
stimulated by open access policies far exceed any revenues that might be
generated through cost recovery policies;
·
Cost
recovery policies often mean that budgetary constraints prevent some government
agencies from acquiring information that has already been created or collected
by another part of government, resulting in agencies either doing without or
using inferior alternatives;
·
No one
supplier, public or private, can design all information products required to
meet the needs of all users in a modern information-based economy. Private
sector intermediaries are increasingly important players in the rapidly
developing information economy;
·
European
information service providers are increasingly frustrated at the competitive
advantages enjoyed by their American counterparts;
·
A
recognition that efforts to build transnational data sets, be they
meteorological or environmental (where serious problems have already arisen),
statistical or cartographic, are hampered by national agencies bent on preserving
intellectual property to pursue local cost recovery policies;
·
A
growing understanding of the wealth creating possibilities (‘prosperity
effects’ in the words of one Dutch study) that arise from a common information
base (e.g. US street mapping) or software standard (e.g. the World Wide Web).
This report examines fundamental differences in
the policy and funding models for public sector information (PSI) in the US as
compared to Europe. The following figure illustrates these differences.
This report seeks to demonstrate the economic
and societal benefits of open access and dissemination policies for public
sector information, particularly as compared to the limitations of the “cost
recovery” or “government commercialisation” approach.
It focuses primarily on the
conclusions of recent economic and public policy research in this area, as well
as examples of failed or limited cost recovery experiments in the US and
Europe. Emerging European thinking on the issue of government competition with
the private sector, and recent developments at the European Commission level
and in selected European countries are briefly summarized. [2]
The vast economic potential of public sector
information has only recently begun to be recognized in the economics and
public policy literature. Recent significant research, much of it originating
in Europe, documents the effect that governmental information policies have on
the economy in general and on particular sectors.
With respect to the growing
challenge from economists, the European Commission’s Directorate General for
the Information Society commissioned a study from PIRA International on the Commercial Exploitation of Europe’s Public
Sector Information. (“the PIRA study”)[3]. The PIRA study attempts to
quantify the economic potential of public sector information in Europe and the
extent to which it is being commercially exploited, and suggests policy
initiatives and good practices. Although some of the qualitative data had to be
extrapolated, the study should be sufficient to persuade policy makers of the
need for serious rethinking of European information policy and its high
priority. PIRA
states:
“Cost recovery looks like an obvious
way for governments to minimize the costs related to public sector information
and contribute to maximizing value for money directly. In fact, it is not clear
at all that this is the best approach to maximizing the economic value of public
sector information to society as a whole. Moreover, it is not even clear that
it is the best approach from the viewpoint of government finances. […]
Estimates of the US public sector information market place suggest that it is
up to five times the size of the EU market.”
The PIRA study went on to observe
that the fledgling European market would not even have to double in size for
governments to more than recoup in extra tax receipts what they would lose by
ceasing to charge for public sector information. The problem is that these
positive macro-economic effects are masked by the adaptation of European
markets to cost recovery policies, by which both individual agencies and
partner publishers have grown adept at extracting monopoly rents from captive
markets to their own benefit but to the detriment of the economy at large.
Furthermore, as the study noted with understatement:
“The
concept of commercial companies being able to acquire, at very low cost,
quantities of public sector information and resell it for a variety of
unregulated purposes to make a profit is one that policymakers in the EU find
uncomfortable.”
The
amounts of money involved are significant. PIRA distinguished between government investment in public
sector information (“Investment Value”) and the value added by users in the
economy as a whole (“Economic Value”). Economic Value could not be directly
obtained, so aggregated data was used. PIRA estimated the Investment Value of
public sector information for the entire European Union at 9.5 billion
EURO/year. The Economic Value was estimated at 68 billion EURO a year. By
comparison, the Investment Value for the United States is 19 billion EURO/year
and the Economic Value is 750 billion EURO/year. To summarize:
Economic Potential of PSI in Europe and US
|
||
|
In EUROs |
EU |
US |
|
Investment value |
9.5 billion |
19 billion |
|
Economic value |
68 billion |
750 billion |
This contrast points to both opportunities
and challenges for European companies and their governments. PIRA’s main
conclusions are:
·
Charging for public sector
information may be counter-productive, even from the short term perspective of
raising direct revenue for government agencies;
·
Governments should make
public sector information available in digital form at no more than the cost of
dissemination;
The fledgling EU market would not even have to double in size for governments to more than recoup in extra tax receipts what they would lose by ceasing to charge for public sector information
;
Governments realize two kinds of financial gain when they drop charges:
Higher indirect tax revenue from higher sales of the products that incorporate the public sector information; and
Higher income tax revenue and lower social welfare payments from net gains in employment.
A study commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of
the Interior examined both qualitative and quantitative prosperity effects of
different pricing models for public sector information[4]:
no cost, marginal cost and full cost recovery. Its main conclusions:
Prosperity effects will be maximized when data is sold at marginal cost. Marginal cost is defined as all costs related to the dissemination of public sector information. This includes shipping, promotional costs, personnel and information technology costs.
·
Enormous additional economic activity can be expected
by extrapolating the study’s results to all public sector information.
A U.S. National Academy of Sciences
study[5]
which examined the practices of commercialized government agencies in Europe
and experiences with privatization of environmental data in the US concluded:
“…[c]ountries
that exercise intellectual property rights over government data…limit the
extent to which government-collected data can be used, even in international
collaborations. By making it more difficult to integrate global data sets and
share knowledge, such a commercialization policy will fail to achieve the
maximum benefits provided by international collaboration in the scientific
endeavor.”
For
example, basic research on monsoon prediction at the India Institute of
Technology is hampered by the unaffordable prices for historic atmospheric
model data from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting. As a
result, the researchers are not able to integrate the European data with freely
available US data.[6]
Thus, the Academy recommended:
·
Environmental
information created by government agencies to serve a public purpose should be
accessible to all. To facilitate further distribution, it should be made
available at no more than the marginal cost of reproduction, and should be
usable without restriction for all purposes.
·
The
practice of public funding for data collection and synthesis should continue,
thereby focusing contributions of the private sector primarily on value-added
distribution and specific observational systems.
A study[7] commissioned
by the private sector members of the Dutch Federal Geographic Data Committee
attempts to quantify the economic effects of open access policies for spatial
data. The main conclusions are:
·
Consumers
as well as private business can profit significantly from freely accessible
public sector information;
·
Growth
potential for the geographic information industry: lowering the price of public
sector geographic data by 60% would lead to a 40% annual turnover growth plus
employment growth of approximately 800 jobs. Companies that pay a much lower
price for public sector information will invest these savings in the
development of new products, thereby expanding the potential market.
A North American-European comparative study on the impact of government
information policies, which focused on databases from national mapping agencies[8],
concluded that:
·
A
direct association exists between pricing and its effects on public access and
commercialisation of government agency information. Current pricing problems are having a
deleterious effect on the affordability of spatial data in Canada, France, and
the United Kingdom;
·
A
direct association exists between the application of intellectual property
rights and the degree of public access and commercialisation of government
agency information. The greater the restrictions on access, the less successful
dissemination programs will be;
·
Reducing
prices and relaxing intellectual property restrictions on government datasets
are significant factors improving opportunities for access and
commercialization for stakeholders in the geographic information community.
A study prepared for the Canadian government examined the European
Database Directive, which does not exclude governments from using the database
protection right and gives European governments an extra argument for cost
recovery policies. [9] Therefore,
its findings are important in the debate on public sector information policies:
·
During
its first year, the new protection right seems to have produced a one-time
boost in database production and the number of new firms entering the industry.
Since 1999, however,
growth rates have returned to previous low levels.
·
The
European database protection regime has also produced side effects (“negative
externalities” in economic parlance) including:
o
Excessive
protection for certain databases (e.g. phone directories, environmental
observations);
o
New
barriers to data aggregation;
o
New
opportunities for dominant firms to harass competitors with threats of
litigation;
o
Increased
transactional gridlock due to so-called “anti-commons” effects; and
o
Inadvertent
impediments and disincentives for non-commercial database providers, e.g.
universities and other research institutes.
John Zillman, Director of the Australian
Meteorological Department and John Freebairn of the University of Melbourne
recently performed extensive theoretical research on the economics of meteorological
information[10].
Their main conclusions are:
Direct government funding and free provision to all are favored with their contribution to national welfare maximized at the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs.
“Private and Mixed Goods” (i.e. “value added”) meteorological services are most economically produced and provided through market forces.
The Weather Risk Management Association,
representing an emerging economic sector which uses weather and climate data to
mitigate commercial risk, commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers to study the
rapid growth of this industry[11]. The study shows that the weather
risk management industry is booming in the United States (almost 7,300 million
USD in contract value in 3 years ending March 2001) compared to the small
European market (120.3 million USD in the same 3 years)
Notional Value by Contract Coverage Period and
Region, All Contract Types ( in thousands of US Dollars)
|
||||||
Coverage Period
|
North America
|
Europe
|
Asia
|
Australia
|
Other
|
Total
|
Winter 1997
|
169,410
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
169,410
|
Summer 1998
|
733,932
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
733,932
|
Winter 1998
|
1,101,306
|
320
|
0
|
0
|
300
|
1,101,926
|
Summer 1999
|
639,861
|
0
|
1,561
|
0
|
0
|
641,422
|
Winter 1999
|
2,242,562
|
70,690
|
2,799
|
0
|
1,689
|
2,317,740
|
Summer 2000
|
623,553
|
183
|
15,920
|
594
|
262
|
640,512
|
Winter 2000
|
1,785,632
|
48,146
|
29,147
|
1,929
|
10,279
|
1,876,133
|
Total
|
7,296,256
|
120,339
|
49,427
|
2,523
|
12,530
|
7,481,075
|
A comparison of US and European commercial
meteorology activity also illustrates a significant disparity. The prosperous
commercial meteorology activity in the US has resulted in a tenfold difference
in the number of firms, revenue, and job creation.[12]
|
Commercial Meteorology in
the US and Europe |
||
|
US$ |
US |
Europe |
|
Gross
receipts |
400-700
million |
30-50
million |
|
Number
of firms |
400 |
30 |
|
Number of employees |
4000 |
300 |
Given that the US and EU economies are
approximately the same size, the primary reason for the European weather risk
management and commercial meteorology markets to lag so far behind the US is
the restrictive data policies of a number of European national meteorological
services.
The larger public policy issue behind public
sector information policies is whether or not commercial government activities
that compete with the private sector are proper for a government agency funded
primarily by the taxpayers. In 1995, European national meteorological services
prevailed in the World Meteorological Organization on the issue of replacing
the organization’s previous policy of full and open exchange of meteorological
information with a procedure (WMO Resolution 40, CgXII), which sanctions
charging and use restrictions on broad categories of data. In the words of the
National Academy’s “Privatization” study, summarized above:
“The change of policy was aimed at preventing private sector entities from competing with national meteorological services in Europe, which recoup costs through sales of data and services… WMO Resolution 40 substantially decreased the amount of data member nations made freely available.[13]
Three recent examples illustrate the Academy’s
point.
In Switzerland, a commercial meteorology
firm alleged that the Swiss national meteorology office was engaging in price
discrimination by offering discounted, nominal prices to its own commercial
arm. The Swiss competition authority held:
“Anyone engaging in the sale of meteorological [data]
as well as providing sovereign activities, is acting as an independent party in
the commercial process and, as a public undertaking, is subject to the
provisions of the Antitrust Act…In the Swiss market, [the Swiss Meteorological
Institute] has a market-dominating position. It must make available to
interested third parties on a non-discriminatory manner all the data and
products which it uses for its own services.”[14]
In Germany, the leading news magazine
Der Spiegel recently published an expose of the German meteorological service,
Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD)[15]. It claimed that the DWD was also
engaging in price discrimination in an attempt to drive its newly emerging
commercial weather service “competitors” out of business. DWD was said to be
offering completely produced and ready to air weather forecasts to television
and radio stations at prices equal or lower than charged the commercial
meteorological firms for the raw data on which to base their competing
broadcast forecasts. According to atmospheric sciences professor Dr. Michael
Sachweh of the Ludwig-Maximilians University in Munich:
“This is for sure no fair competition… The commercial companies are pushed to the wall.”
In an apparent attempt to drive commercial
weather companies out of business, the Finnish Meteorological Institute
(FMI) deliberately degraded its radar images between June 1999 and December
1999 when delivering them to the Scandinavian Composite consisting of radar
images for Finland, Sweden and Norway, which is sold to private sector commercial
weather services. The degraded radar images contained false radar signals
(“clutter”) which users mistook for rain. In its own operations, the FMI used
the high-quality radar observations.
The Finnish Competition Authority found that
the FMI abused its dominant position in the national meteorological data market
and recommended an infringement fine of FIM 200,000 (33,500 Euro) on the FMI
for its breach of competition legislation. To remedy this situation, the
Finnish government has announced plans to separate and privatise the commercial
arm of FMI as a self-sustaining private sector entity without government
subsidy, and retain its “public purpose” functions in a taxpayer funded
government agency subject to open data policies.[16]
In addition to Finland, two other European
countries are actively reconsidering the wisdom of such policies and practices.
In Sweden, the Agency for Administrative
Development’s (Statskontoret) seminal report “The State as Commercial Actor”
identified a range of issues associated with government entities entering the
commercial field and the effects on the private sector[17]. For example, they found that the
National Land Survey:
·
Had an
unfair competitive advantage over emerging commercial firms;
·
Was
the dominant player in the geographic information market;
·
Is the
“preferred” provider in the market due to its “official” status;
·
Has
access to taxpayer-funded “strategic infrastructure”, including government
owned information technology assets;
·
Has
copyright and other rights over public sector data;
·
Is
partly funded by taxpayer Kronor and enjoys monopoly rents from other entities;
·
Obscures
the demarcation between government and private activities.
In light of these findings the Statskontoret
recommended that the commercial arm of the National Land Survey be completely
privatised, subject to open public audit and oversight, and its data holdings
placed in the public domain for access by the general public and competing
private sector entities.
As follow-on to “ The State as Commercial Actor,”
the Statskontoret was asked to examine the operations of the Swedish
Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI), and has reached similar
conclusions.[18]
It recommended that the commercial functions of SMHI be split off into a
private corporation, and the essential government functions of SMHI be retained
in a government agency with an open and unrestricted data policy. The study went one step further by
recommending that the practice of “cross-subsidization” of SMHI by “assignment”
work from other government agencies should cease. Validated requirements of
agencies responsible for roads, fisheries, forestry, etc. would either be put
out to bid, or would be designated as inherently governmental and specifically
authorized to be performed by SMHI
under direct appropriations. The
Statskontoret recognized, as argued elsewhere in this paper, that transfer
payments from other government agencies have usually been counted by national
meteorological services as part of their “commercial” revenues, and touted as
part of their success at “commercialisation.”
An effective date for the separation of SMHI into private and
governmental arms has yet to be established.
In the Netherlands, the Ministry of
Economic Affairs published a report on unfair government competition with the
private sector in the specific context of public sector information.[19]
The main conclusions were:
·
Public
sector databases should be made available to third parties on a
non-discriminatory basis at uniform prices;
·
The
public sector should not make unnecessary modifications to databases to create
unfair competition. In other words, information services directly linked with
the “public task” are allowed, and all other (commercial or “value added”)
services are forbidden;
·
Additional
(commercial) information services may only be provided by the public sector
when there is a public need for such services, and no private sector company is
already providing that service and it is unlikely that any private sector
company is going to pursue it in the near future.
Based on this report, the Dutch government
separated the commercial arm from the Dutch Royal Meteorological Institute into
a commercial entity.
The Swedish and Dutch studies agree generally
with consensus views in the US, which are restated by Stiglitz, et al., “Role
of Government in a Digital Age”[20]. The Computer and Communications
Industry Association commissioned Nobel Laureate and former chair of the US
Council of Economic Advisors, Joseph Stiglitz, to analyse the role of
government in a digital age, with particular emphasis on public-private
competition issues through a number of agency case studies. With regard to the
National Weather Service partnership with the private sector and the balance
between public and private roles, the report concluded: “The National Weather
Service seems to strike this balance well.”
An opposite viewpoint remains prevalent among
commercialised European government agencies, particularly among national
mapping and meteorological agencies. It has been articulated formally in the United
Kingdom, where Ministries actively encourage government bodies to develop
value-added services charged at market prices:
“All government bodies will be free to offer
value added products and services providing this is done in a transparent
manner in a level playing field among all market participants.[21]”
In December 2001, the UK government
preliminarily decided to transfer the entire Ordnance Survey from a “Trading
Fund” to a government-owned public limited company (PLC) with the government
owning 100% of the shares. By contrast, in Sweden (land office and met office,
SMHI), the Netherlands (met office, KNMI) and soon Finland (met office, FMI),
the approach is privatization of the "commercial arm" while retaining
the "public interest" arm in the government. The belief in Sweden,
Holland and Finland is that the basic observing systems and the official
forecasts and warnings generated from their data are inherently governmental,
as are the public interest mapping and land registration functions of the
Swedish land office. This approach inevitably leads to an open data policy
since the new "spin off" will need to fend for itself against competition,
and the only way to guarantee a "level playing field" is through an
open data policy.
In the Ordnance Survey situation, as pointed
out by the Swedish Statskontoret in the context of the analogous Swedish
agency, if the entity performs both governmental and commercial functions it
will tend to have a natural monopoly position due to economies of scale and
other factors, and will continue to need infusions of taxpayer funds (even if
under contract rather than as a direct appropriation) as "commercial"
revenues will not be adequate to fund the "public interest" aspect.
If this is accompanied by the right to control the underlying data, funded in
part by the taxpayers, healthy competition from other private entities and the
overall growth of that economic sector will be impeded.
Using a different model, the UK Met Office has
recently entered into a joint venture with
private sector interests to create a new entity, Weather Exchange Ltd.,
which will carry out the functions of the Met Office’s commercial arm, and seek
to develop and market a range of value added products. The private interests
will contribute capital and staff, and the Met Office will contribute data and
staff. Outstanding questions are whether this new entity will have any of the
competitive advantages cited by the Swedish Statskontoret in the context of
publicly owned commercial entities, and whether the Met Office will adopt a
completely open data policy. How these questions are answered will determine
whether the commercial meteorology and weather risk management industries in
the UK begin to expand, and at what rate.
There have
been a number of examples of failed cost recovery experiments in the United
States at both the Federal and State levels, which demonstrate concretely the
practical effects of restrictive data policies.
·
The “Automated
Tariff Filing and Information System” (ATFI) was created by the US Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC) to collect, manage and disseminate data on tariffs
filed by common carriers, including information on cargo types, shipping
destinations and service contract terms. In November 1992, Congress passed the
“High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act,” Public Law 102-582, which
included a requirement that FMC collect user fees from anyone directly or
indirectly accessing ATFI data. The goal was to raise $810 million over three
years by charging 46 cents per minute to retrieve the information directly or
indirectly. However, the actual user fees collected were $438,800, which was
only 0.05% of the original mandate.[22] This dramatic failure can be
attributed to (1) optimistic assumptions about the perceived inelasticity of
tariff data, and (2) failure to consider the possibility that users may obtain
tariff data from other sources.
·
The United
States Geological Survey (USGS) in the early 1980’s attempted to move
towards cost recovery by increasing prices for data products including maps. As
a result, demand dropped so precipitously that the USGS was forced to quickly
reduce prices to recapture the previous market. After reducing the charges to
previous levels, sales took three years to return to their earlier level. After
this failed attempt towards aggressive cost recovery, the USGS struggled for several
years to find a balanced method to recover dissemination costs, suggesting that
recovering dissemination costs only is not always easy. USGS has recovered
close to 100% of its dissemination costs for the past 4 years, which they now
realize is the practical upper bound of cost recovery.[23]
·
A
spectacular example of the failure of cost recovery for data comes from the State
of California.[24] California encouraged State level
agencies to charge fees to local levels of government within the state for
products derived directly from base data provided by these same local levels of
government. This cost recovery policy resulted in several problems. First, some
local governments could no longer afford to pay for the same products they once
obtained at no cost, leading to a disincentive for these local governments to
continue providing updated data to the State. Second, some local governments
retaliated against the State-level agencies by charging their own user fees.
While the State of California has since returned to the “free” system, some
local governments continue to charge user fees. Now, due to local government
assertion of intellectual property rights, the State cannot include information
in public documents obtained from local governments that charge user fees for
that information. This has led to incomplete datasets, and State regional plans
have a “swiss cheese” appearance, with some areas containing significantly more
detail than others. These incomplete and internally inconsistent maps can be
particularly troubling during public emergencies when complete, accurate, and
easily accessible data is essential. Recognizing the failures of cost recovery
policies, California has begun to move towards a statewide open data policy.
·
A
tale of two counties.
An unintended controlled experiment in cost recovery was performed by two
counties in Wisconsin[25]. Clark County adopted a cost of
dissemination policy for its digitized aerial photographs (digital
orthophotos); and Brown County adopted a full cost recovery policy for its
identical products. The inexpensive data in Clark Co. led to widespread use by
individuals who might not otherwise have even tried using the data. People
invested in CAD/GIS software and availed themselves of the County data for a
broad range of applications. People got "hooked" on using the data
and kept coming back for more. The contrast with Brown County was striking. The
cost recovery pricing did not discourage a small number of specialized users
such as professional surveyors or others who have site-specific projects where
only one section or two of data was needed. However, those needing much larger
areas, e.g. entire townships or cities, were deterred by the high pricing. As
the county program manager stated:
“Some of the responses from people requesting
data is, ‘I can't afford that! That blows the entire budget for this project’.
So they choose not to buy ANY of the data, hang up the phone, and generally go
away with a bad taste about the entire program. I don't think we're generating
much support this way. When people choose not to use our data because it is too
expensive, what are the implications? Most people who want to use the data are
doing something to the land which affects the community that we all live in.
Without good, accurate data, are these people able to make the best decisions?
I've seen it from both sides of the fence, and I plan to work on revising our
policy.”
We believe
the perceived benefits of cost recovery have generally been overstated by
commercialised European government agencies. The following five examples
support this point:
·
The Ordnance
Survey (OS) of the United Kingdom was chartered as a semi-independent
Executive Agency in 1990, and is required to maximize its reliance on revenue
from customer entities. However, OS does not approach full cost recovery. Of
the £100 million annual OS revenues, only £32 million comes from
commercial product sales. The remainder comes from other central, regional and
local government departments and agencies as well as from entrenched usage of
large scale maps by the recently privatised utilities. These remaining revenues
cannot reasonably be characterized as “commercial”, but rather are a
combination of monopoly rent and reallocation of public money from one public
sector ledger to another, with no net benefit to the taxpayer or the Treasury.
·
Similarly,
the UK Meteorological Office gets 50% of its “commercial” revenue as a
transfer payment of taxpayer funds from the Ministry of Defence, and reportedly
another 20% of its revenue from other UK government agencies.[26] The Met Office recently decided to
make significant categories of basic observational (surface) data available for
free due to negligible revenue from data sales and a growing recognition of the
benefits of open access policies.
·
The Deutscher
Wetterdienst (DWD) was reorganized in a 1998 statute that explicitly
authorized its commercial activities with a mandate that it minimize reliance
on general state funding. However, an audit report issued October 25, 2000 by
the German Federal Accounting Office (Bundesrechnungshof), shows that this cost
recovery policy has not met expectations[27]. Also, in spite of years of
expensive consulting assistance, DWD has been unable to set up transparent
accounting standards. Data sales recover less than 1% of total expenditures. In
sum, DWD has yet to minimize the expenditures that are not covered by income
and decrease the burden on the general budget. The report finds that without
significant new revenue sources, for example new charges on regulated aviation
users of meteorological data, DWD will not achieve its statutory cost recovery
mandate.
·
The European
Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting is losing private meteorology
firm customers for its operational model outputs due to unaffordable prices
required to be charged by its national meteorological service sponsors. The
emerging European commercial meteorology industry is rapidly taking advantage
of increasingly inexpensive computational capacity to run their own localized
versions of freely available US atmospheric models, and are using freely
available US data to initialise those models.
·
Three
documents under consideration in the Lower Chamber will impact the policy
framework for making government information available in the new millennium.
The plan “Towards the optimum availability of government information”, has
developed an ambitious agenda, and declares that government information must be
easily and widely accessible and available. It contains a clear analysis of the
judicial framework concerning the use of government information. As far as
effectivity is concerned, the plan has a certain degree of “try not to step on
anyone’s toes” especially in the category of “remaining information.”
·
The
Netherlands completed a comprehensive policy review under its Electronic
Government Action Programme, “Towards Optimum Availability of Public Sector
Information.” This brings the information policies of the Netherlands into
close harmony with those of the United States. However, implementation may be
less than smooth. The policy objective pursued by the Action Programme is to
ensure that public sector information is as widely accessible and available to
citizens as possible. First, citizens need that information in order to
participate in the democratic process. Secondly, the economy will benefit from
public sector information being made available in an open and unrestricted
manner. The Action Programme expressed concern that public sector bodies had
been reserving copyright and database protection rights on a large scale, and
that this was contrary to the spirit of Dutch FOI law. It proposed that no license
fee should be charged for the use of public databases, and that copyright and
database-right required conditions should only be set for external use to
protect the public interest and third party rights.
·
The
“Government and Markets” Directive[30], specified that public sector
databases could be made available to third parties only on a non-discriminatory
basis and at uniform prices. It also indicated that the public sector should
not make unnecessary modifications to databases to create unfair competition.
This report led to the separation of the commercial arm of the Royal
Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) in 1999 as a limited liability
corporation (no public sector employees) into a company called Holland Weather
Service. Since then, the Dutch government has implemented the following
policies:
o
Stepwise
designation of all meteorological data as “essential” under WMO Resolution 40;
o
Adoption
of an “open and unrestricted” data dissemination policy with charges limited to
distribution costs only.
·
The UK
government has accepted the general principle of providing government data at
marginal costs.
·
However,
Trading Funds, e.g. the Ordnance Survey and the Met Office, are specifically
excluded from this principle. In general, trading funds have the most
interesting public sector datasets when it comes to opportunities for the
private sector and the scientific and research communities[31]. The Trading Funds are, however, to
“improve” (i.e., make transparent) pricing and dissemination policies.
·
A
trend within the UK towards making basic data available is illustrated by a
freedom of information law that was enacted in November 2000 and will be
implemented starting fall 2002. However, a counter trend towards increasing
commercialisation of government agencies still exists, particularly in the
cases of the Ordnance Survey and the Met Office, discussed above.
·
Financial
targets for Trading Funds are set by the Treasury, and reflect the cost of
assembling data, not its value. The problem this creates is illustrated by the
decision to make 2001 Census Data free of charge when it became clear that
public sector bodies wouldn’t budget to buy the data, which costs £250
million to assemble.. In addition, the UK Meteorological Office is now openly
disseminating categories of meteorological observations which are of
potentially great public benefit, but which did not generate significant
revenue for the agency.
·
The
1999 Publicity Act provides for a general right of access to legally defined
administrative documents created, sent, or received by a government agency,
including electronic records, on condition that the document is in the public
domain. A public authority can collate various databases and make them
available. Data from various public sources can be combined and reused. The
authorities also are to promote public access to information and they are
expected to pro-actively publicize their activities and to ensure all relevant
documents are readily available.
·
No Federal freedom of information law exists in Germany, but one is
being considered. As
regards access to public sector information, an official statement on the
intent of the law under consideration is that, ‘People should be able to access
original documents at any time on-line and perform transactions which are
important for their daily lives with the administration via the Internet. The
public authorities need to make increasing use of the technical possibilities
now available to make their administration work transparent for everyone.’
However, data policies and commercial reuse of government information do not
seem to be under consideration.
·
In
July 2001, a potentially significant competition case in the information field
arose in Germany[32]. The
European competition Commissioner ordered the German company IMS Health to
license its geographical “brick” system to competitors due to abuse of its
dominant market position. The “bricks” are geographic grids that break down
countries and cities into meaningful geographical units for analysing public
health related geographical patterns e.g. doctors’ prescriptions, drug sales
and public health trends. In the view of the Commissioner, the “bricks”
constitute a de facto industry standard in Germany, also known as an “essential
facility” in antitrust law, and for there to be fair competition IMS health
must license its copyright on reasonable terms. The decision, which is being
challenged in German courts, indirectly implicates the question of what types
of public sector information may form an “essential information
infrastructure”. In short, is compulsory licensing of essential government
databases on equitable terms necessary to foster a competitive private sector
information industry?
·
The
consensus of recent research is that charging marginal cost of dissemination
for public sector information will lead to optimal economic growth in society
and will far outweigh the immediate perceived benefits of aggressive cost
recovery. Open
government information policies foster significant, but not easily
quantifiable, economic benefits to society.
·
Over
the long term, the cost recovery goal of European governments’
commercialisation approach cannot succeed, because:
o
The
private user base that can be charged is not large enough to support recovery
of the full costs of a comprehensive, unsubsidized information service;
o
Charging
other government users merely shifts the expenses from one agency to another
rather than actually saving the national treasury any money;
o
Due to
some of the fundamental economic characteristics of information (high
elasticity of demand, public good characteristics) one must question whether
any governmental entity can successfully raise revenue adequate to pay not only
for the dissemination of its information but also for the costs associated with
creating the information for governmental purposes in the first instance.
o
High
prices for information ultimately lead to predatory and anticompetitive
practices, like price dumping, and the creation of government owned corporations
or joint ventures with preferred private sector entities that may serve to
exclude others from the market.
·
The
most sensible solution is to separate commercial activities into truly
commercial entities separate from the government and adopt open access
policies. Separation of commercial activities would be the basis not only for
an open market in accordance with European competition law, but also guarantee
market structures with maximum overall economic potential.
·
Some government agencies are willing to
liberalize their policies, but fear that they will suffer budget consequences.
Therefore, the relevant government Ministries must come to understand that open
data policies will create wealth and tax revenues more than adequate to offset
the short term “losses,” and that they need to fully fund agency information
activities.
In sum, recognition is slowly
emerging in Europe that open access to government information is critical to
the information society, the scientific endeavor, and economic growth. However,
recent trends towards more “liberal” policies face opposition. This comes from
treasuries as well as from entrepreneurial civil servants in charge of
“government commercialization” initiatives, who are sometimes tempted to engage
in anti-competitive practices. Therefore, these issues require consideration at
the highest policy making levels of government.
Recognizing the scale of the opportunity presented, and the speed of
enabling technological change, the US and the EU should commit to move forward
together to take the practical steps necessary to establish internationally
harmonized open and unrestricted data policies for all public sector
information.
[1] Respectively, 44 United States Code Chapter 35, and 61 Federal Register 6428 (February 20, 1996).
[2] This
summary report is accompanied by a longer monograph that includes as Appendices
a primer on the economics of information, a point-by-point refutation of
arguments commonly made in support of cost recovery, and suggestions for
further research. They are not summarized here.
[3] PIRA International (2000) Commercial Exploitation of Europe’s Public Sector Information. Final Report for the European Commission, Directorate General for the Information Society.
[4] Berenschot and Nederlands Economisch Instituut (2001) Welvaartseffecten van verschillende financieringsmethoden van elektronische gegevensbestanden. Report for the Minister for Urban Policy and Integration of Ethnic Minorities.
[5] “Resolving conflicts arising from the privatization of environmental data”, Committee on Geophysical and Environmental Data. Board on Earth Sciences and Resources. Division on Earth and Life Studies. National Research Council. Washington, DC. National Academy Press, 2001.
[6] Goswami, et al “Association between quasi-biweekly oscillations and summer monsoon variabilities,” Indian Meteorological Society (March 2001)
[7] Ravi Bedrijvenplatform (2000) Economische effecten van laagdrempelige beschikbaarstelling van overheidsinformatie. Publication 00-02.
[8] Lopez, Xavier R. (1998) The dissemination of spatial data: a North American-European comparative study on the impact of government information policy. Ablex Publishing Corporation. See also: Lopez, Xavier R. (1996) The impact of government information policy on the dissemination of spatial data. PhD Thesis. University of Maine, Department of Spatial Information Engineering.
[9] Maurer, Stephen M. (2001) Across Two Worlds: Database Protection in the US and Europe. A paper prepared for Industry Canada’s Conference on Intellectual Property and Innovation in the Knowledge Based Economy. May 23-24, 2001. See also: Stephen M. Maurer, P. Bernt Hugenholtz, and Harlan J. Onsrud. Intellectual Property: Europe's Database Experiment. Science 2001 October 26; 294: 789-790. (In: Policy Forum).
[10] Zillman, J.W. and J.W. Freebairn (2000). Economic Framework for the Provision of Meteorological Services. Also see the background papers: Freebairn, John W. and John W. Zillman (2000). Economic Benefits of Meteorological Services. In: Meteorological Applications (2002). And Freebairn, John W. and John W. Zillman (2000). Funding meteorological services. In: Meteorological Applications (2002).
[11] PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001) The weather risk management industry: survey findings for November 1997 to March 2001. Prepared for the Weather Risk Management Association, June 2001.
[12] Sources: Commercial Weather Services Association, Association of Environmental Data Users of Europe.
[13] National Research Council (2001). Resolving conflicts arising from the privatization of environmental data. National Academy Press.
[14] Swiss Competition Commission (November 16, 1998). The case is being appealed on other grounds.
[15] Der Spiegel, Issue 47 at p. 230 (November
19, 2001).
[16] Interview with Finnish Competition Authority, September 2001.
[17] “The State as Commercial Actor” (2000). Available only in Swedish.
[18]"Prognos för SMHI - myndighet, bolag eller både och?" ("Forecast for the SMHI - authority, company or both?") 11 January 2002. Available only in Swedish.
[19] Ministry of Economic Affairs (1997). Markt en Overheid; spelregels voor gelijke concurrentieverhoudingen tussen overheidsorganisaties en private ondernemingen.
[20] Stiglitz, et. al. (2000). Role of Government in a Digital Age. Computer and Communications Industry Association. October 2000.
[21] Department of Trade and Industry (2000) Click-Use-Pay – Hewitt. News Release September 6, 2000, P/2000/602.
[22] United States General Accounting Office, Accounting and Management Division, March 10 1995 GAO/AIMD-95-93R ATFI User Fees. Also see: Washington Post Editorial, August 4 1992, Boats, Budgets and a Bad Idea.
[23] Blakemore, Michael and Gurmukh Singh (1992) Cost Recovery Charging for Government Information. A false economy? pp. 30-34; updated by USGS staff.
[24] National States Geographic Information Council (2001) Fees for Data discussion. Informal e-mail discussion.
[25] E-mail from Jeff DuMez, Coordinator, Brown County Land Information Office (Dec. 2001).
[26] See “It’s raining weathermen”, The Financial Times (April 23.2001).
[27] Bundesrechnungshof (2000)
Gebühreneinnahmen aus Flugwetterdienstleistungen des Deutschen Wetterdienstes
and Entwicklung der Ausgaben und Einnahmen des Deutschen Wetterdienstes.
[28] Statement of Charles DuPuy before the Swedish Meteorology Society, October 2000.
[29] WMO Regional Office for the Americas, Regional Seminar on Marketing for NMHSs (September 2001).
[30] Directive on market activities conducted by government departments, Dutch Official Journal 1998, no. 95.
[31] See e.g. Lopez, Xavier points out the importance of National Mapping data for commercial purposes.
[32] The Economist August 25th 2001. “Battling over bricks. A growing row over intellectual property rights”. P. 54.